This paper examines the implications of Nepal's exchange rate policy for its export performance over the period 1980-2010. We first document Nepal's long-standing currency peg against the Indian rupee and that Nepal's real exchange rate appreciated substantially from the late 1990s. We then employ a gravity modeling approach to confirm that this real exchange rate appreciation has adversely affected Nepal's exports, especially to third-country markets. Nepal's exchange rate-related export competitiveness trap provides a motivation to reconsider the current peg.
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Introduction
The choice of exchange rate regime for a landlocked developing country involves several considerations. One is the effect on exports. Landlocked countries have to rely heavily on bordering countries for connections to international markets, although for some goods this reliance can be reduced by the use of air transport. Higher transport costs typically increase the costs of goods from landlocked countries, placing them at a disadvantage in international markets. This is particularly so for developing countries, the economies of which are often focused on the production of bulky agricultural and manufactured goods rather than light goods and services. The disadvantage could be further exacerbated by the choice of a fixed exchange rate regime in the context of comparatively rapid producer-price inflation, which would combine to result in an appreciation of the real exchange rate against the currency to which the peg applies, and potentially other currencies also. This paper will document that this type of real exchange rate appreciation has occurred in Nepal, to the detriment of Nepal's exports. The results provide a motivation for Nepal to reconsider the current peg of the Nepalese rupee (NRe) against the Indian rupee (IRe).
The mountainous landscape of the Himalayan range has led Nepal to seek access to the sea via India only, with most merchandise exports to third-country markets travelling more than 1,000 1 We are grateful for comments from Prema-chandra Athukorala, Max Corden, Peter Warr, anonymous reviewers, and participants at presentations at the Australian National University.
kilometers to reach the Bay of Bengal at Kolkata. Nepal's dependence on India and desire for macroeconomic stability have seen it maintain a fixed exchange rate against the IRe, with no change to this rate since 1993. As will be seen, however, Nepal's average producer prices increased at a relatively fast rate since the 1990s, causing a real exchange rate appreciation vis-à-vis the IRe. Our calculations show that Nepal's real exchange rate also appreciated against the currencies of other partner countries from the late 1990s to the end of our sample period 2 Panday (2014) also reports that Nepal's real exchange rate was overvalued as of 2008 (the last year of their analysis). The IRe has depreciated against major currencies such as the US dollar, euro, and Japanese yen since 2010, which has somewhat alleviated Nepal's export competitiveness trap. Nepal's peg means that any overvaluation against the IRe remains unaffected by this change.
Our method involves two steps. We first document Nepal's exchange rate policy and the real currency appreciation the country experienced during the late 1990s and the 2000s. We then employ gravity modeling to confirm that Nepal's real exchange rate appreciation has been a significant contributor to its poor export performance. The analysis covers Nepal's merchandise exports to its largest twenty export markets over the period 1980-2010.
Our finding that Nepal's fixed exchange rate has seen it enter an export competitiveness trap presents a case that is consistent with the results of Nilsson & Nilsson (2002) , who report that flexible exchange rates boost export performance among a sample of more than 100 developing countries. Our results also provide an illustration of the warning of Ghosh & Ostry (2009) that, when they result in real overvaluations, pegged exchange rate regimes can be economically damaging. In addition to being of direct policy relevance to Nepal, our findings may be of interest to, for example, the other landlocked developing countries that peg their currency to that of a large neighbor (e.g. Bhutan, Lesotho). As far as we are aware, this is the first paper to provide a systematic analysis of the effect of Nepal's real exchange rate on its exports. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an analysis of Nepal's exchange rate, documenting the real appreciation it experienced in the late 1990s and 2000s. Section 3 discusses Nepal's export performance. Section 4 details our gravity model. Section 5 presents the gravity model results. The final section concludes.
Nepal's exchange rate
Recent history has seen the NRe fixed to the IRe, with occasional adjustments until the early 
where REER is the real effective exchange rate index, BERI is a nominal exchange rate index, WP is the GDP deflator of a partner, and DP is Nepal's GDP deflator. The index is for NRe per partner currency, so an increase denotes a depreciation of Nepal's real exchange rate. We The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), which concluded on 1 January 2005, was a system of quotas on textile exports of developing countries to developed countries. During the MFA era, Indian firms set up clothing and garment operations in Nepal to avoid the MFA quota on garment exports from India. When the MFA was abolished, some of these firms exited Nepal (Athukorala & Sharma, 2006) . Our estimations will control for these other factors that may have influenced Nepal's merchandise exports over our estimation period. Nepal's contribution to global merchandise exports halved over the years 2000-2010, and the share of merchandise exports in its GDP fell by two-thirds, to only 5%. Nepal's per capita real GDP growth rate over the decade was 2.4% per annum, equal to the country's long-run average real GDP per capita growth rate over the full period 1980-2010 (World Bank, 2014a). The decade was thus more challenging for Nepal's export sector than for its economy as a whole, consistent with the effects of an export competitiveness trap associated with real exchange rate appreciation. 
Nepal's exports
Gravity model approach
The gravity model, proposed by Tinbergen (1962) and known as a "workhorse" by international trade economists (Bergeijk & Brakman, 2010) , explains trade flows in terms of "mass" variables such as the GDPs of the reporting and partner countries, as well as the geographic distances between them. The real exchange rate is often used to measure price factors. To examine the effects of Nepal's real exchange rate appreciation on its exports, we use a Nepal-centred augmented gravity model with partner fixed effects, of the form:
where is partner, is year, and L denotes the natural logarithm. represents partner fixed effects, which capture time-invariant variables such as the distance between Nepal and its partners and remove the need to explicitly control for these factors. , is a stochastic error term, assumed to have a normal distribution. We present standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by partner. Details of the variables and their expected signs are as follows. 
EXPORTS:
GDPS:
The product of the nominal-US$ gross domestic products of Nepal and the partner.
Other gravity modeling studies to include the log of the GDP products as a mass variable Specifications of Eq. (2) will be presented for both (1) total merchandise exports to each country and (2) manufacturing exports, which dominate Nepal's merchandise export structure.
We present estimates with the basic gravity variables (the GDP, population, real exchange rate, and time trend measures) and also with the full set of variables in Eq. (2). We also present results excluding India from the partner set in order to investigate the degree to which movements in Nepal's real exchange rate have affected exports to markets other than the one to which the peg applies. The rationale for including the set of controls is to isolate the effect of Nepal's real exchange rate on exports to each partner country from the effects of other economic and political factors. One concern is potential reverse causality from the GDP term to exports. Our results on the L(REER) term are similar in estimates that exclude the GDP term, however. We also obtain similar results in specifications using a log rather than a linear time trend. Table 3 presents our estimates of Eq. (2). The coefficient of the real exchange rate variable (REER) is statistically significant for total merchandise exports (columns 1-2) and manufacturing exports (columns 3-4), indicating that a 1% decrease in the NRe to foreign currency exchange rate (i.e. an appreciation of Nepal's currency) is associated with a lowering of Nepal's merchandise exports to that partner of around 1.3-1.5%, on average. This confirms that Nepal's appreciating real exchange rate since 1998 has contributed to lowering Nepal's merchandise exports, as economic theory would suggest (Corden, 2002) . We obtain similar results controlling for the partial or full set of controls, and using either total merchandise exports (columns 1-2) or exports of manufactured goods (columns 3-4).
Gravity model results
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The log of the product of the GDPs of exporter and importer is statistically significant in all estimations, with the coefficients indicating that a 1% increase in the GDP product on average is associated with an increase in Nepal's exports of 0.5-0.7%, ceteris paribus. The coefficients for the log product of the populations are large and highly significant, suggesting that population size rather than economic size is of most relevance to changes in Nepal's export pattern over time. The time trend signals a secular decline in Nepal's exports on average, holding the other variables constant.
The results on the other controls in Table 3 theorem. 8 The regional trade agreement coefficients are positive, but only significant at the 10% 7 We also obtain similar results if we restrict our estimation sample to the period from 1998 on, when Nepal saw overall real exchange rate appreciation. 8 Our need to extrapolate the Nepal tariff rate variable -particularly for early years -reduces our confidence in this result, although we obtain a similar estimate if we drop the early years.
level. We find evidence that the ending of the MFA and the period of the Maoist movement were times of abnormally poor export performance, particularly for manufactured products. 
Conclusion
This paper has examined the role of Nepal's real exchange rate appreciation in explaining the country's poor export performance. Our results imply that, after controlling for other relevant variables, real exchange rate appreciation has had a materially adverse effect on Nepal's exports, with the appreciation in Nepal's real exchange rate vis-à-vis the 20-partner group over the period 1998-2010 being associated with a reduction in Nepal's merchandise exports of around two-fifths (relative to the counterfactual of an unchanged real exchange rate). Nepal's real exchange rate appreciated by more against third-partner currencies (see Figure 2) , meaning that exports to these other markets have been particularly adversely affected.
The results highlight export-competitiveness effects of the practice of pegging the Nepalese rupee to the Indian rupee. In the first decade of the new Millennium, the currency peg brought
Nepal into an export competitiveness trap as domestic inflation and appreciation of the IRe saw the real exchange rate become overvalued (IMF, 2011 (IMF, , 2012 Panday, 2014) . This situation need not always be the case, as depreciations of the IRe may benefit Nepal's export competitiveness at other times. A key feature of Nepal's current exchange rate regime, however, is that real exchange rate appreciations -particularly against third-country markets -can occur for reasons quite unconnected to Nepal's economy (i.e. due to appreciation in the IRe relative to other currencies). Comparatively rapid inflation in Nepal adds to the problem.
Exchange rate regime choice involves several considerations. When it comes to avoiding export competitiveness traps, the results suggest that Nepal may wish to reconsider its current peg, either by an adjustment to the peg rate or by moving to a more flexible exchange rate system. Nepal could perhaps learn lessons from Botswana, which maintains a crawling peg, or other landlocked developing countries such as Paraguay that have floating exchange rates.
Several scholars (e.g. Patnaik et al., 2011; Rajan, 2012) have noted that there is a gradual move to more flexible exchange rates among emerging economies in Nepal's region.
Nepal also has other opportunities to boost its export performance. One is to focus on improving transport infrastructure so as to reduce transport costs to world markets. A fruitful option might be the improvement of airports to facilitate the export of high-value low-weight goods. Nepal may be landlocked, but it is not air locked. An increasing emphasis on facilitating air-freighted exports may be a useful strategy to reverse the decline in Nepal's goods exports to countries other than India.
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